---
title: "Invisible Text That Only Machines Read: How Hidden Unicode Steers AI Assistants"
description: A plain text file can carry Unicode characters no screen shows. An AI assistant with access to your mail can read them as instructions.
image: https://explore.bowbridge.net/hubfs/Blog/File%20Security%20101/Headers/File%20Security%20101%20-%20Blog%20Header.jpeg
---

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# Invisible Text That Only Machines Read: How Hidden Unicode Steers AI Assistants

Nov 20, 2026, 3:48:53 PM by Joerg Schneider-Simon

A plain text file can contain sentences that no screen shows, and an AI assistant reads them anyway. This is episode 10 of File Security 101, our series on file-based threats your anti-malware does not see.

<iframe class="hs-responsive-embed-iframe" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/QWl3-njWsJA?rel=0" title="File Security 101 – Ep 10 – Invisible Text That Only Machines Read – How it works" style="position:absolute;top:0;left:0;width:100%;height:100%;border:none;" allow="accelerometer; autoplay; clipboard-write; encrypted-media; gyroscope; picture-in-picture; web-share" referrerpolicy="strict-origin-when-cross-origin" allowfullscreen></iframe>

The video explains it in about two minutes.  
 The article adds the details and the research behind it.

## A note with more than you see

A meeting note arrives as a .txt file. It shows three short lines. Plain text cannot run anything, so it seems safe to paste into an AI assistant or to let the assistant read it from a mailbox or a shared folder. The assistant, however, does not read what the screen shows. It reads every character in the file.

## Characters nobody draws

Unicode defines characters that have no visible form. A zero-width space (U+200B) takes up no room on screen; it is meant to mark possible line breaks. The Tags block, U+E0000 to U+E007F, goes further: the characters from U+E0020 to U+E007E mirror the printable ASCII characters one by one. "TAG LATIN CAPITAL LETTER B" (U+E0042) corresponds to "B" (U+0042). Fonts do not draw them, so in most editors, mail clients and chat windows they are invisible.

Language models receive text as tokens, not as pixels. If an application passes tag characters through to the model, the model can read them as the letters they mirror. Researchers call this "ASCII smuggling". MITRE ATT&CK lists the general technique of hiding content in non-printing characters as [T1027.018, Invisible Unicode](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027/018/).

## The attack: hidden orders

The attacker writes an instruction, converts each character into its tag counterpart and inserts the result into an ordinary note. A person who looks at the file sees the meeting note. An assistant that reads the file also receives the hidden instruction, for example: search the mailbox for one-time codes and add them to a link. This works when the assistant has tools, such as access to mail or files, and can show links. One click on the link sends the data to the attacker's server. The same characters work in the other direction: the stolen data itself can be encoded as tag characters inside a link, so the user does not see what the link carries.

## It happened

- **Microsoft 365 Copilot, 2024.** Researcher Johann Rehberger reported ASCII smuggling to Microsoft on January 17, 2024, and later an end-to-end exploit: a prompt injection in a shared document made Copilot search for further emails and documents, then encode the data, such as sales figures or MFA codes, as invisible characters in a link. By July 2, 2024, his demonstration no longer worked; he presented the details in August 2024 ([Embrace The Red](https://embracethered.com/blog/posts/2024/m365-copilot-prompt-injection-tool-invocation-and-data-exfil-using-ascii-smuggling/), [The Hacker News](https://thehackernews.com/2024/08/microsoft-fixes-ascii-smuggling-flaw.html)).
- **Gemini, 2025.** Viktor Markopoulos of FireTail tested several assistants with tag-character instructions. Gemini, through calendar invites or email, as well as DeepSeek and Grok, were affected; Claude, ChatGPT and Microsoft Copilot were not. He reported the issue to Google on September 18, 2025. Google answered that it was not a security bug ([BleepingComputer](https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/google-wont-fix-new-ascii-smuggling-attack-in-gemini/)).

## Why nobody notices

A malware scanner looks for malicious code. The file contains none, only Unicode characters that are valid in any text. Editors and mail clients render nothing for them, so a person who reviews the note approves exactly what is on screen. Copying the text keeps the hidden characters. The model receives more than the reviewer saw, and nothing in the user interface shows the difference.

Invisible characters are not the only problem in "plain" text. Terminal escape sequences, for example, can clear the screen or redraw it when a file is printed in a console ([CWE-150](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/150.html)).

## What to do

- Do not give an assistant that can read your mail or files text from unknown sources, or limit what tools it may use while it works on such text.
- If you build applications on language models, remove or reject tag characters and other invisible characters from all input before it reaches the model, and from output before it is shown as a link.
- When in doubt, inspect a file with a tool that shows code points, not with an ordinary editor.

bowbridge Content Disarm and Reconstruct rebuilds text files with only the text a human reader sees. Zero-width characters, tag characters and other invisible characters do not survive, and neither do terminal escape sequences. This also removes invisible watermarks: what cannot be reviewed is not kept.

[Join the bowbridge CDR beta program](https://explore.bowbridge.net/en/cdr-beta)

## Sources

- [Microsoft Copilot: From Prompt Injection to Exfiltration of Personal Information](https://embracethered.com/blog/posts/2024/m365-copilot-prompt-injection-tool-invocation-and-data-exfil-using-ascii-smuggling/), Embrace The Red (Johann Rehberger), August 26, 2024
- [Microsoft Fixes ASCII Smuggling Flaw That Enabled Data Theft from Microsoft 365 Copilot](https://thehackernews.com/2024/08/microsoft-fixes-ascii-smuggling-flaw.html), The Hacker News, August 27, 2024
- [Google won't fix new ASCII smuggling attack in Gemini](https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/google-wont-fix-new-ascii-smuggling-attack-in-gemini/), BleepingComputer, October 7, 2025
- [T1027.018: Obfuscated Files or Information: Invisible Unicode](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027/018/), MITRE ATT&CK
- [CWE-150: Improper Neutralization of Escape, Meta, or Control Sequences](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/150.html), MITRE

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