---
title: "A PDF Carrying Its Own Malware: How Embedded Files Deliver the Payload"
description: The payload travels inside the PDF as an attachment, with no download link to check. TA505 used this to spread a remote access trojan.
image: https://explore.bowbridge.net/hubfs/Blog/File%20Security%20101/Headers/File%20Security%20101%20-%20Blog%20Header.jpeg
---

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# A PDF Carrying Its Own Malware: How Embedded Files Deliver the Payload

Nov 16, 2026, 1:00:00 PM by Joerg Schneider-Simon

A PDF can carry complete files inside it, and an attacker can use that feature to deliver the payload without any download link to check. This is episode 6 of File Security 101, our series on file-based threats your anti-malware does not see.

<iframe class="hs-responsive-embed-iframe" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/sK3ZAH-cxgc?rel=0" title="File Security 101 – Ep 6 – A PDF Carrying Its Own Malware – How it works" style="position:absolute;top:0;left:0;width:100%;height:100%;border:none;" allow="accelerometer; autoplay; clipboard-write; encrypted-media; gyroscope; picture-in-picture; web-share" referrerpolicy="strict-origin-when-cross-origin" allowfullscreen></iframe>

The video explains it in about two minutes.  
 The article adds the details and the research behind it.

## A PDF with a paper clip

A delivery notice arrives as a PDF. Next to the text, the reader shows a paper clip or an attachments panel: the PDF has a file attached. That is a normal feature. Contracts carry the spreadsheet they refer to, invoices carry an XML version for accounting software, and PDF portfolios bundle whole sets of files.

## Embedded files: a PDF as a container

Inside, each attached file is stored as an embedded file stream, usually compressed, and described by a file specification with its name. The document catalog lists these files in a name tree called `EmbeddedFiles`. The reader shows them in its attachments panel. When the user opens one, the reader hands it to whatever program Windows associates with its type. A link annotation or a script in the PDF can ask the reader to open an attachment as well.

## The attack: the payload travels inside

The attacker attaches the payload to the PDF itself. Adobe Acrobat and Reader do not open every type: risky extensions such as `.exe`, `.bat` and `.bin` are blocked by default, and attachments can only open files or programs on a built-in allow list without asking ([Adobe](https://www.adobe.com/devnet-docs/acrobatetk/tools/Wizard/attachments.html)). Attackers therefore choose types that are not blocked: a Windows settings file that runs a command, or a Word document that loads an exploit. The text of the PDF tells the reader to open the attachment, the reader asks for confirmation, and the user clicks OK. From then on, the attacker's malware runs on the computer.

## It happened

In July 2018, Proofpoint reported that the group it tracks as TA505 had embedded a `.SettingContent-ms` file, a Windows settings shortcut, in PDF attachments ([Proofpoint](https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/ta505-abusing-settingcontent-ms-within-pdf-files-distribute-flawedammyy-rat)). The actor was first seen doing this on June 18, 2018; on July 16, Proofpoint observed a campaign of hundreds of thousands of messages. JavaScript in the PDF opened the embedded file, Adobe Reader asked the user whether to open it, and a click on OK let Windows run it. A PowerShell command in the file then downloaded and ran the FlawedAmmyy remote access trojan.

In May 2022, HP Wolf Security described a PDF named `REMMITANCE INVOICE.pdf` that carried a Word document as an embedded file ([HP Wolf Security](https://threatresearch.ext.hp.com/pdf-malware-is-not-yet-dead/)). The attackers named the Word file "has been verified. However PDF, Jpeg, xlsx, .docx", so that the reader's prompt to open it looked like a verification message. If Word's Protected View was turned off, the document downloaded an RTF file that exploited [CVE-2017-11882](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-11882), a flaw in the Microsoft Equation Editor that is on CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities list. Its encrypted shellcode then downloaded and ran Snake Keylogger, an information stealer.

## Why it slips through

Here the PDF does carry malware, or leads to it, and it still gets through. Embedded files are a normal, standards-compliant PDF feature, so filters let PDFs with attachments pass. The payload is compressed inside a stream and must be extracted before anything can look at it. In the HP case, the embedded document did not even contain the final malware: it fetched an exploit from a web server, and the exploit's code was encrypted. What a scanner needs to judge sits several layers down, or outside the file altogether.

## What to do

- Open files attached to a PDF only when you expect them, and never because the PDF's text tells you to.
- Check your PDF reader's settings. In Adobe Acrobat and Reader, the Trust Manager preferences control whether attachments may open other files and applications; administrators can lock this with "Prevent document from opening other files and launching other applications" (`iFileAttachmentPerms` set to 1 under `FeatureLockDown`).
- Keep Office up to date and leave Protected View on: the 2022 chain depended on both being missing.

bowbridge Content Disarm and Reconstruct rebuilds the PDF from its pages, text and images. Embedded file streams and the `EmbeddedFiles` name tree are not carried over, so the rebuilt document contains its pages and nothing attached to them.

[Join the bowbridge CDR beta program](https://explore.bowbridge.net/en/cdr-beta)

## Sources

- [File attachments](https://www.adobe.com/devnet-docs/acrobatetk/tools/Wizard/attachments.html), Adobe Acrobat Customization Wizard documentation
- [TA505 abusing SettingContent-ms within PDF files to distribute FlawedAmmyy RAT](https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/ta505-abusing-settingcontent-ms-within-pdf-files-distribute-flawedammyy-rat), Proofpoint, July 19, 2018
- [PDF malware is not yet dead](https://threatresearch.ext.hp.com/pdf-malware-is-not-yet-dead/), HP Wolf Security, May 20, 2022
- [CVE-2017-11882](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-11882), National Vulnerability Database

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